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Abstract—While becoming more and more present in our
every day lives, services that operate on users’ locations or
location trajectories suffer from general fear of misappropri-
ation of the transmitted location data. Several works have
investigated of how to cope with this drawback. Respective
systems claim location-privacy, i.e. keeping users’ locations
secret, by employing anonymisation techniques concerning a
user’s identity, or by obfuscating the transmitted location.
These approaches lead to a degrade of quality-of-service and
can be vulnerable to de-anonymisation attacks, or allow to
learn at least the approximate location of a user. Focusing on
the application domain of geo-fencing, we present as remedy a
protocol that is based on homomorphic encryption of a user’s
location. The protocol provably provides full location-privacy
by non-exposure of the users’ location data, while producing
exact geo-fencing results. We provide a detailed definition of
the protocol, show its applicability in an actual geo-fencing
application, and show that the resulting system fulfills all
security properties we see for a location-privacy preserving
system.
Keywords-location-based service; geo-fencing; data privacy;
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I. INTRODUCTION
Location-based services [1], [2] are information services
accessible with mobile devices through the mobile network.
They utilise the ability to access, store and analyse real-time
geographic information from mobile devices, and, in turn,
provide service offerings such as orientation and localisation,
navigation, search, identification or checking [3].
Despite considerable user uptake, e.g., in real-time social
systems [4], [5] or travel-related applications [6], [7], and
promising potentials in commerce [8] or smart cities [9],
[10], widespread adoption of location-based services is im-
peded by specific concerns regarding location privacy [11]
and general fear of misappropriation [12].
These qualms hold in particular for location-tracking
services [13], i.e. location-based services that capture or
predict users’ location trajectories. One prime example of
location-tracking services is geo-fencing, a class of location-
based services that trigger actions or fire events whenever
mobile devices enter or exit virtual perimeters set up for
geographical areas known as geo-fences.
Clearly, a straight-forward approach to avoid misappro-
priation of users’ location data, are client-based approaches
that perform all processing of location information locally
on the mobile device. But not only can entirely client-
based approaches come with several drawbacks [14], they
moreover require mobile devices to constantly perform com-
putations against geo-fences locally, using processing power
and draining battery of the device.
This paper is therefore concerned with designing a pro-
tocol for network- and cloud-based privacy-preserving geo-
fencing services that provably does not leak any location
information to any party that is involved with the geo-
fencing evaluation.
Towards this end, we present NEXUS (Non-Exposure
User location privacy System), a protocol for multi-party
geo-fencing evaluation that employs an asymmetric, ho-
momorphic encryption scheme to satisfy non-exposure of
the users location, non-exposure of the geo-fences, and
computational correctness of the geo-fencing evaluation. The
presented approach has been prototypically implemented,
being efficient enough to be employed in actual geo-fencing
applications.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II discusses the related literature on privacy preservation
in location-based services. System assumptions, an adver-
sarial model, as well as properties that a location-privacy
preserving system should fulfill, are described in Section III.
Our NEXUS protocol for location privacy-preserving geo-
fencing evaluation is presented in Section IV, along with
an algorithm that, based on the NEXUS protocol, correctly
evaluates rectangular-shaped geo-fences; the fulfillment of
the previously stated location-privacy properties is discussed
subsequently. We conclude with summary and future work
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The available literature on location privacy preservation
techniques is vast, and can be categorised into four working
principles. We briefly outline the underlying key ideas and
refer the interested reader to representative works in each
category.
Regulation: Legal frameworks [15] governing collection,
processing and distribution of individuals’ location infor-
mation have been established in most nations. However,
regulation itself cannot prevent invasion of privacy, often
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lags behind new technology and innovations, and might stifle
location-aware applications.
Policy-based approaches [16], [17] address the definition
of trust-based mechanisms for proscribing certain uses of
location information. These mechanisms are often highly
complex and of questionable practicality for highly dynamic
location-aware environments. More importantly, policy sys-
tems rely on extratechnological pressures to ensure privacy
policies are adhered to.
Anonymisation approaches rely on the notation of k-
anonymity, i.e. a node is made indistinguishable from at
least k − 1 other nodes, to prevent location privacy in-
vasion. Popular techniques for achieving k-anonymity are
location cloaking [18], [19], controlled flooding [20] or
obfuscation [21], to name a few. Pseudonymisation [22],
a variation of anonymisation, assigns persistent but non-
identifying pseudonyms to individuals. Anonymisation is
by far the most popular approach to (location) privacy
preservation, however, it presents a barrier to authentication
and personalisation, deliberately degrades quality-of-service,
and exhibits vulnerabilities to de-anonymisation [23].
Secure multi-party computations (SMPC) enables par-
ties to jointly compute an arbitrary agreed function of their
private inputs with the computation results guaranteed to
be correct. Prior works investigate multi-party computa-
tional geometry [24], [25], [26], privacy-preserving proxim-
ity detection in a two-party setting [27], privacy-preserving
algorithms for determining fair multi-party rendez-vouz
points [28] or nearest-neighbor queries [20]. Although clos-
est to our approach, we are not aware of secure multi-party
protocols for privacy-preserving geo-fencing.
III. SYSTEM, ADVERSARY AND REQUIREMENTS
In the following, we model a geo-fencing system and a
privacy-invading adversary. Ensuing, the privacy properties
that our solution should satisfy are outlined.
System Model. We assume the existence of a set of
mobile nodes M, a geo-fencing service G, and a set of
nodes S subscribed to geo-fencing events generated by G.
Each node Mi ∈M may periodically publish its location
information in the form (Mi, E(L)) to the geo-fencing
service G, where L ∈ R2 specifies Mi’s current location and
E(L) denotes a representation of L suitable for our concerns.
The service G manages a number of geo-fences, each of
which is a tuple of the form (F,S ′ ⊆ S). We denote a geo-
fence’s boundary with F, and restrict ourselves to rectangles
on the R2 plane, thus F = {A,B,C,D}. The set S ′ contains
the nodes subscribed to the geo-fencing events for (F,S ′ ⊆
S) as generated by G.
Upon receiving a tuple (Mi, E(L)), G determines if Mi
is inside or outside of any eligible geo-fence (F,S ′) by
evaluating
f(E(L),F) =
{
1, L ∈ F
0, L /∈ F (1)
using solely E(L) and F.
Based on f(E(L),F), G issues notifications to the
subscribers in S ′. Hence, a subscriber s ∈ S ′ is informed
about whether or not a mobile node Mi ∈M is within the
geo-fence to which s was subscribed, however, s has no
knowledge about the particular geo-fence itself.
Adversary Model. Attacking the system as modeled
above, the adversary primarily intends to break a mobile
node’s location privacy. That is, the adversary will try to
systematically and secretly record any Mi’s current or past
location for later use.
We assume that mobile nodes in M publish their
locations correctly, and that they cannot be physically
tracked by the adversary. Secondly, we assume G and
nodes in S to be semi-honest, i.e. these nodes run the
protocol exactly as specified but may try to learn as much
as possible about the locations of nodes in M. Finally, we
consider the adversary to be computationally bounded.
Privacy Properties. The properties that we intend to
provide for a geo-fencing system in the presence of
privacy-invading adversaries are given as follows:
(P1) Location Non-Exposition. No party must be must able
to obtain Mi’s current or past location from interaction
or observation.
(P2) Location-privacy Preservation. No party must be able
to learn or deduce Mi’s current or past location from
interaction or observation.
(P3) Computational Correctness. Semi-honest parties are
guaranteed to produce the correct outputs.
(P4) Network Assistedness. Since completely client-
oriented approaches present several drawbacks [14],
some information about a mobile nodes’ locations
must be published to a remote party to not leave all
crucial computations to the clients (in our case, the
mobile nodes).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has
investigated properties (P1) - (P4) in our context. As outlined
before, regulation and policy-based systems rely on extrat-
echnological pressures to ensure privacy; anonymisation-
based approaches certainly violate (P1) and (P3) and exhibit
vulnerabilities with respect to (P2); SMPC approaches do
not yet address geo-fencing services at all.
IV. PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Obviously, encryption seems to be a suitable way to
represent L to G. The chosen encryption scheme needs to
provide certain characteristics to allow evaluation of f solely
based on E(L).
For this, in the following, we first provide some basics
about cryptography and homomorphic encryption. Ensuing,
we introduce our Non-Exposure User location privacy
System (NEXUS) protocol for geo-fencing services, based
on a homomorphic public key encryption scheme. Finally,
we provide an overview of our prototype implementation
and detail on how to perform geo-fence containment tests
within the constraints of our chosen encryption system.
Preliminaries. A conventional encryption scheme consists
of the following functions:
• Key generation function generates a symmetric en-
cryption and decryption key ek or an asymmetric [29]
public-private key pair (pk, sk) based on some param-
eter.
• Encryption function Ek(x) outputs a ciphertext from
plaintext x using a key k.
• Decryption function Dk(x) outputs a plaintext from
ciphertext x using a key k.
For any plaintext x, one has Dek(Eek(x)) = x for symmetric
schemes and Dsk(Epk(x)) = x for asymmetric encryption
schemes.
In addition, homomorphic encryption [30], [31] features
characteristics
Ek(m1) Ek(m2) = Ek(m1 •m2) (2)
In other words, a homomorphic encryption scheme enables
specific computations on ciphertexts and generates encrypted
results which, when decrypted, match the results of opera-
tions performed on the respective plaintexts.
We will in the following show that homomorphic
encryption is thus suitable to evaluate f in Equation (1)
solely by the provided Ek(L), as required. As homomorphic
encryption requires to encrypt all operands with the same
key (cf. Equation (2)), the chosen encryption scheme must
be a public key encryption scheme, as otherwise, parties
that need to encrypt values during the process could use
the symmetric key to decrypt Eek(L).
Protocol. Our protocol is based on a public key
infrastructure (PKI) and a suitable homomorphic encryption
scheme. We do not rely on the geo-fencing service G acting
as a trusted third party (TTP), but rather on the collaboration
of G and a certificate authority and evaluation service A
taking the role to provide network assistedness. Hence, we
extend our system model as indicated in Figure 1. The
protocol then is as follows:
À The certificate authority A generates a public-private
key pair (pk, sk) and shares pk on demand with every other
party.
Á Each Mi may periodically send information about its
location L in the form (Mi, Epk(L)) to G.
Figure 1. The actors and high level interactions in NEXUS.
Â G can not decrypt Epk(L) or any results of homomor-
phic computations based on Epk(L), but instead homorphi-
cally computes an (encrypted) intermediate result R as
R = fG(Epk(L),F) (3)
with fG being a function that homomorphically operates
on Epk(L), and F the boundary of a geo-fence (F,S ′)
as defined in Section III. G can encrypt F with pk for
homomorphic operations, where necessary.
Ã G passes R, the ID of the mobile node Mi, and the
set of subscription nodes S ′ that are to be invoked based on
the evaluation result to A.
Ä A then evaluates L ∈ F by an evaluation function fA,
such that
L ∈ F⇔ fA(R) = true
A can decrypt R with sk, where necessary. By this, f as
given in Equation (1) is computed as
f(Epk(L),F) = [fA ◦ fG ](Epk(L),F)
Å A will invoke the respective subscriber s ∈ S ′ with the
result of the evaluation and the ID of the mobile node Mi.
Implementation. We base our implementation of above
protocol on the Paillier encryption scheme. Implementation
details concerning key generation, encryption, and
decryption functions are found in [32]. Paillier features
homomorphic addition:
Ek(m1)⊕Ek(m2) = Ek(m1)∗Ek(m2) = Ek(m1+m2), (4)
and pseudo-homomorphic multiplication of a ciphertext
by an unsigned integer u:
Ek(m)u = Ek(u ∗m), (5)
with + and ∗ being arithmetic addition and multiplication.
Moreover, using Equations (4) and (5), we can homomor-
phically subtract by adding a negated ciphertext.
Ek(m1)	Ek(m2) = Ek(m1)⊕Ek(m2)−1 = Ek(m1 −m2) (6)
Figure 2. To check if a point is inside a rectangle, the point is projected
perpendicular to the sides of the rectangle
In our implementation, every position is a two dimen-
sional vector consisting of a longitude and latitude value,
which we indicate by indices lon and lat. We determine if
a position L is inside a rectangle by testing perpendicular
projection (see Figure 2) as follows:
0 ≤ #   »AL · #    »AB ≤ #    »AB2 ∧ 0 ≤ #   »AL · #    »AD ≤ #    »AD2 (7)
Upon receiving a tuple (Mi, Epk(L)), G computes for
a rectangular geo-fence F = {A,B,C,D} the terms of
Equation (7) as
R = { #    »AB2, #    »AD2, Epk( #   »AL · #    »AB), Epk( #   »AL · #    »AD)},
constituting fG , cf. Equation (3).
G has to calculate Epk( #   »AL · #    »AB) and Epk( #   »AL · #    »AD)
homomorphically due to encrypted L. For this, G encrypts
F with the shared public key pk. One can show that with
Equations (4), (5) and (6), definition of dot product, and
component-wise computation, it holds that
Epk( #   »ALlat) = Epk(Llat)	 Epk(Alat),
similar for longitude components, and with that
Epk( #   »AL · #    »AB) = Epk( #   »ALlat)
#   »
ABlat ⊕ Epk( #   »ALlon)
#   »
ABlon ,
and similar for Epk( #   »AL · #    »AD).
The calculated values R are then sent to the certificate
authority and evaluation service A along with the node ID
Mi and the subscription nodes S ′ of the actions to trigger.
A decrypts the encrypted results with the secret key sk,
evaluates Equation (7) as fA, and invokes the according
subscribers.
Performance evaluation. For our performance evaluation
deployment, we implemented G and A as Python
applications with Flask1 as backend Web-server. Same holds
for the prototype client that we used for testing. Parties
communicate with HTTP requests. For the homomorphic
cryptography, we used the n1analytics/python-paillier
Python library2. On a workstation (Linux, i5-2520M at
1http://flask.pocoo.org/
2https://github.com/n1analytics/python-paillier
2.50GHz, 16GB RAM), we measured evaluation times of
an average 323 milliseconds (1000 executions, network lag
not included) per evaluation of fA ◦ fG with a 2048-bit
Paillier key. The measured time is in the ranges suitable
for an execution that is perceived ”uninterrupted” by
users [33]. Thus, we consider NEXUS practicable for actual
application.
V. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS
The goal must be, that by our architecture and protocol,
the security properties (P1) to (P4) can never be violated by
a semi-honest adversary.
Adversaries, in our presented architecture the geo-fencing
service G, certificate authority and evaluation service A, and
subscriptions S, could try to obtain Mi’s secret location L
directly (violating (P1)), which would require them to be in
possession of both the encrypted location Epk(L) and the
secret key sk to decrypt L.
Or they could try to approximate L by observing eval-
uation of geo-fences (F,S ′). For this, they would either
need to learn about both F and the outcome of f(Epk(L),F)
(Equation (1)). Or they need to know about the set S ′ ⊆ S
that is registered to a geo-fence (F,S ′). Observing then if
any s ∈ S ′ was invoked as a result of an evaluation would
allow to deduct the evaluation outcome against a geo-fence
boundary F.
In the following, we show that by employing the protocol
as described in Section IV, none of these attacks are
possible, and by this, the security properties (P1) to (P4) as
stated in Section III are always fulfilled:
Location Non-Exposition (P1): The geo-fencing service G
only receives the encrypted location Epk(L) from a mobile
node Mi. G is not in possession of the private key sk to
decrypt the data, nor does it need to decrypt any value by
exploiting the homomorphic characteristics of the Paillier
system as described in IV. G can thus at no point obtain L
directly. The Authority service A, though in possession of
the private key sk, never receives any encrypted location
Epk(L) from neither Mi nor G. Thus, A does at no point
obtain information about L. Subscribers in S receive neither
sk nor the encrypted location Epk(L). (P1) is by this always
satisfied.
Location-privacy Preservation (P2): With G defining
the geo-fences (F,S ′), it is clearly in knowledge about
both F and S ′. G is not in possession of sk and by this
can not decrypt the evaluation result and invoke any of the
subscriptions S ′ based on it. G can thus neither obtain, nor
observe the result of an evaluation for a geo-fence (F,S ′).
G does not disclose information about geo-fence bound-
aries F to any party, and in particular no information
about to which geo-fence (F,S ′) subscriptions s ∈ S ′ are
registered. A by this can never observe for which geo-
fence (F,S ′) it decrypted the evaluation result. To retrieve
L from the decrypted values
#   »
AL · #    »AB and #   »AL · #    »AD,
A would need knowledge about the geo-fence boundary
F = {A,B,C,D}, which is never disclosed by G.
Subscribers in s ∈ S receive the result of an evaluation,
but do not have knowledge about the geo-fence boundary
F, as F is not disclosed by G. By this, a subscriber can not
observe the location of a mobile node by observing its own
invocation.
None of the transmitted data or computational
intermediate results are stored during the process. By
this, (P2) is always fulfilled.
Computational Correctness (P3): None of the parties
willingly provides wrong data during the process, as we
assume all participants to be semi-honest. Correctness of
computations during the evaluation is moreover ensured
by the homomorphic characteristics of the chosen Paillier
encryption scheme. We have shown the correct computation
of a containment check of L against a rectangle based on
the Paillier homomorphism in Section IV. (P3) is by this
always fulfilled.
Network Assistedness (P4): Mobile nodes do not
receive geo-fences from G and by this can not perform
geo-fencing evaluation computations on their own. They
need to provide some information to a third party, in this
case, Epk(L) to G, which performs the evaluation with the
help of A. As shown above, information exchanged during
this process is not sufficient for any other party to violate
(P1) to (P3), and (P4) is always fulfilled.
VI. FUTURE WORK
We have in this paper limited ourselves to rectangular
geo-fence shapes. For future work, we plan to investigate
how to evaluate containment of a users’ position in arbi-
trarily shaped geo-fences within the possible mathematical
operations as imposed by the encryption schemes.
Geo-fences are defined independently. This allows for
parallel evaluation of multiple geo-fences. We plan to do
further research on highly scalable large-scale distributed
setups of several instances of geo-fencing and evaluation
services, employing capabilities of latest Infrastructure-as-
a-Service and virtual container management systems.
We moreover see in the proposed solution a promising
approach to realise general purpose validation tasks in
distributed IoT environments, similar to works on homo-
morphic privacy preserving multi party computations as for
example presented in [34]. In fact, while we focused on
the geo location validation as use-case in this paper, we
see promising application opportunities for every kind of
numerical computations or validations, like for example fac-
tory process sanitary monitoring in an Industrie 4.0 scenario,
general sensor analysis in a Smart City environment, and
other.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented NEXUS (Non Exposure
User location privacy System), a novel protocol for geo-
fencing systems that ensures location privacy based on non-
location exposure by employing a homomorphic encryption
scheme.
In the paper, we have presented the following contribu-
tions to the topic:
Based on a list of properties for location-privacy preserv-
ing geo-fencing schemes, we have developed a protocol for
a geo-fencing system that, unlike existing approaches, does
not rely on anonymisation or obfuscation of the user. Instead,
it utilises characteristics of homomorphic encryption. This
allows to perform the evaluation entirely on encrypted loca-
tion data. We have shown that by our protocol, provably, the
correct result of the geo-fencing evaluation can be computed.
The location of the client is kept entirely secret to all parties
involved with the evaluation process.
The presented protocol was implemented in a prototype
application for rectangular geo-fences based on the Paillier
encryption system [32]. The prototype performed the com-
putation in time ranges that allow for an actual applicable
system.
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